

*X add: Deputy to the DCI for
National Intelligence Officers
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community*
DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : * Career Development and Training for Analysis
in CIA

1. Attached is a study of this subject prepared for
the Director of Training by [REDACTED]

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25X1A [REDACTED] The study was commissioned by the DTR primarily
as a guide to him in developing plans within the Office of
Training. He recognized, as have the authors of the study,
that the successful analyst must possess several qualities
which cannot be transmitted to him by formal classroom
training, and that on-the-job training and specialized
courses and programs within directorates and offices (or
outside the Agency) form necessary parts of the career
development of the individual analyst. Accordingly, while
concerning themselves specifically with preparing recom-
mendations and proposals for curriculum development within
the Office of Training, [REDACTED] have
tried to take account of the primary role of the directorates
and offices in the development of analysts and to isolate
for OTR's concern those aspects of analytic training which
could be best administered by OTR as the Agency's central
training facility.

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2. The report recognizes that before an analyst is employed by CIA he has acquired much of the professional knowledge and skills which he uses in his work, and that in addition a good analyst possesses hard-to-define qualities of objectivity, intellectual rigorousness, perceptiveness, and clarity of mind. It is the responsibility of recruiters to find such qualified people, not of the Office of Training to try to create them. Nevertheless, the Agency does have the responsibility for helping the new analyst to become adjusted to the intelligence environment and to make the best possible use of his qualifications and pre-employment education. It can help to correct minor deficiencies and it can retool him when new needs arise and new techniques emerge. Moreover, as his career develops, the Agency can utilize its resources to enhance the analyst's abilities, not just to advance his career but to improve the intelligence product and to insure the best use of our resources.

3. In doing these things, the Office of Training and the production offices must be alert, flexible, and adaptive. Many hundreds of people do a variety of analytical work in many grade classifications on many different subjects. There is no one way to help the analyst to develop, and a good deal of tailoring is required. There is no magic formula for creating a good analyst and no easy highway toward high quality intelligence production, but there are various skills

and mind-expanding experiences related to the analytic function which can be provided by the central training facility and by the production offices. The central facility can also bring to general attention some of the excellent training programs within ^{those} ~~individual~~ offices which would be useful for certain ^{analysts} ~~individuals~~ in other offices. The growing complexity of our ~~individual~~ functions requires training to be carefully tailored to the individual need, but the growing interaction of all our concerns requires us to see training as an Agency-wide problem with every office doing its bit, not merely to improve its own performance but to help others improve theirs.

? The old isolation and compartmentation must give way to a process in which we all help educate one another.

In short, the mental framework which training provides is not enough.

4. In order to help orient the new officer, the study proposes an Intelligence Process Course for career trainees and new professional analysts which touches all the major bases from collection through reporting. Such a course would have to be supplemented by specialized orientation--on the job or by formal training--in the production offices.

5. Some special skills needed in particular areas of intelligence will not have been covered, or at least sufficiently covered, in each analyst's education before employment: e.g., econometrics, photographic analysis, telemetry, use of computers, etc. Most of these are probably best taught by

the components which are their primary users. There are other skills which the central training facility can usefully provide. Some new analysts and many already in place throughout the analytic offices might find it very helpful to be exposed to formal classroom instruction in new analytic methods and their application to intelligence analysis. As the subject matter of intelligence analysis has become more extensive and complex, presentation of the results of that analysis in a meaningful and concise way has become more critical; effective presentation is quite properly the responsibility of the production office, and is dependent upon the quality of the analysis and the analyst. But the central training facility should be prepared to help new analysts to adapt quickly to the types of report-writing which are in use, to help in correcting and improving the communicative skills of qualified analysts and editors, and to assist in developing such skills as oral presentation and the use of graphics.

6. The study emphasizes the continued importance of area and country knowledge despite increased technicalization of intelligence. It argues for a judicious blend of area and country knowledge with functional specialization and language proficiency, depending upon the subjects involved and the proclivities of the individual. In the interest of acquiring higher competence, it is recommended that analysts make use of short part-time courses in language familiarization; that

{ there be renewed and serious effort to bring about interchange of personnel among the analytic offices and between them and the area specialists of the DDO; that there be frequent visits by analysts to the areas of their specialization, and that functional specialists be encouraged to acquire better area or country knowledge. It suggests that OTR could be helpful in these efforts by organizing more part-time seminars of a cross-disciplinary character to assist country-area and functional specialists to deepen their understanding of the whole subject of which their own specialties are component parts.

7. In a broader sense, the study also emphasizes the responsibility of the Office of Training for advancing the art of intelligence, not only through the recently established Center for the Study of Intelligence, but through implementation of the Discussion Group Program and through advanced seminars dealing both with substantive and methodological problems. Here too the emphasis would be not upon OTR as a repository for wisdom in this or that field, but upon its opportunity to organize the attention and participation of experts scattered throughout the Agency.

8. The study concludes that the need for analytic-related training is likely to increase rather than decrease in the future. While trying to respond to the need for

improved service to the analytic offices, OTR should not over-respond and preempt training better carried out through career management and on the job. The authors' recommendations do add up to a somewhat greater role for OTR in analytic-related training, but they suggest that any budgetary impact can be attenuated or eliminated in a number of ways. One step which they urge is a higher degree of collaboration between OTR and the analytic directorates and offices in planning, conducting, and managing training and seminar programs.

9. At Annex are (a) a copy of the study in full, and (b) a list of the major suggestions made for changes in the policy and operations of the Office of Training.

(B) Summary of Major Proposals and Recommendations
for the Office of Training

1. Conversion of the Intelligence Production Course to an Intelligence Process Course, to be required of all Career Trainees and open to all new professional analytic personnel.
2. Elimination of required attendance at the Intelligence in World Affairs Course for all who take the Intelligence Process Course.
3. Initiation of a course on New Analytic Methods and their Application to Intelligence Analysis.
4. Initiation of cross-disciplinary seminars for country and area specialists.
5. Initiation of country and area seminars for functional specialists; restructuring the China Familiarization Course and the USSR Country Survey (for example to part-time sessions in the Headquarters building) for those functional specialists for whom it would have specific relevance.
6. Development of a seminar on Intelligence and National Policy.

7. Implementation of the Discussion Group - Advanced Seminar program.
8. Elimination of the Effective Writing Course.
9. Experimentation with a course in Analytic Exercises to replace the course in Intelligence Writing Techniques.
- ✓ 10. Development of a course on The Use of Graphics.
- ✓ 11. Development of a course on Oral Presentation.
12. Announcement of readiness to provide a variety of courses "on demand."
13. Greater use of personnel from the analytic directorates in planning and conducting courses and seminars.
14. The naming of a special assistant to the DTR for analytic-related training.
15. A request to the Intelligence Community Staff for a study of the extent to which OTR may be required to provide analytic-related training to the Community in the future.

Give these together

COMMENTS ON REPORT ON CAREER DEVELOPMENT AND
TRAINING FOR ANALYSIS IN CIAPara 1 (b)

The report identifies one of the reasons for the study as "recognition that the numbers and role of operators" has declined, ~~but~~ there is a serious question whether the "role of operators" has declined. This statement might well be challenged by the Operations Directorate. This statement also suggests that OTR is searching for new missions.

Para 1 (c) (3)

Suggest adding to paragraph "beyond that already offered in information science and general orientation and that planned for operations training of the military in September 1975."

Para 5

The second sentence is gratuitous.

Para 7

The statement that OTR's responsibility include that of the "Agency's principal agent" for career development (as well as training) is not congruent with the Director's stated policy or with current Agency practice.

Para 20

The last sentence is unclear; at the moment tutorials for individuals are tailored.

Para 39 (e)

*NO
Change
Para 39*
Sentence one should delete the phrase "and other qualified new professional employees," as professional employees, except for Career Trainees, will continue to attend the IWA. Accordingly, eliminate the second sentence.

Para 41

Delete parenthetical phrase. In addition, paragraph reflects a misstatement that the new IPC will be open to "all professional employees"; it will be limited to all Career Trainees and new intelligence analysts. The authors had previously taken this position.

Para 42

Eliminate word "bow" and substitute "effort." Eliminate "so-called."

Para 43

In the first sentence drop the phrase "for all new professional employees" and substitute "all Career Trainees and new intelligence analysts." Further drop clause following (a) and eliminate symbol (b).

Para 44

It is not feasible to run six new IPC's per year.

Para 46

Change last sentence to read, "Thus, the writer of a good information report is one who, by building on a good education that is supplemented by reports training, knows what he is writing about, and who knows why and for whom he is preparing a report."

Paras 48 and 49

These paragraphs show confusion concerning the purposes and clientele of the two courses. The penultimate sentence in paragraph 49 is not germane to the subject under consideration.

Para 61

Comments on the application of new analytical and machine-assisted methods to the work of the Intelligence Directorate appears to reflect an insufficient grasp of recent developments. The assertion is likely to be hotly debated by top management in that Directorate as was the previous assertion to the same effect.

Para 63

The sentence in parenthesis has the same problem cited immediately above.

Para 76

It is suggested that the Center for the Study of Intelligence take up a number of substantive topics. It should be noted that the DDI, in a Management Committee meeting in February 1974, strongly opposed the Center's getting into substantive areas.

Para 83 (d)

Little purpose is seen in asserting that OTR has been used as a dumping ground for misfits or that, even if it were indeed a fact, OTR is not making an effort to get the best people available. It is sufficient to say that OTR should be aggressive in seeking high caliber people for rotation.

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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT : DDI Comments on [REDACTED]
Memorandum for Analyst Training

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1. In nearly all respects, we agree with the general thrust of your comments. Indeed, most of the specifics are points with which we also agree. We think that there may be some matters on which we did not make ourselves clear and others on which there may be semantic difficulties.

2. One of your criticisms proceeded from the inference which you drew that the [REDACTED] proposals would result in the enlargement of the Office of Training through the accretion to that office of functions and personnel which are the proper responsibility of the production offices. That inference is incorrect. We have always believed - and our own careers are testimony to this belief - that the most important elements in an analyst's training are what he learned before he was employed and what he learns on the job. We do not propose a substitute. But we do believe that with changing times and responsibilities an individual can quickly and profitably benefit from joining with others in expanding his mental horizons or in practicing or enhancing a particular skill.

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3. We believe, though perhaps we did not make this clear enough, that the training function should be that of facilitator and manager, not controller. We think that OTR, for example, should not duplicate a modern university but that it should provide a place where analysts can educate themselves and each other. OTR has always sought to facilitate outside training, not to impede it, and it has regularly brought outside people in for lectures and seminars to avoid self-insemination. Nothing in our proposals would diminish outside training in any way. Our interest is in serving the needs of those many who cannot take advantage of outside training or who can best be helped by working on real problems in a classified setting.

4. We do not think of an enlarged OTR but of a gradual reduction of OTR's permanent staff and its replacement by some people on rotational tours of duty (say, two years) and by others on temporary assignments running from a week to a year, as the case may be. We would doubt that a single directorate would be asked to supply more than a half-dozen people a year and some of these for but a few weeks or on a part-time basis. We think OTR has too long been separated from the mainstream of activity in the production offices, and we would like to make its programs more relevant by involving production personnel more intimately in the programs and courses which are offered. In the long haul, this should reduce pressures on staffing by the achievement of more effective performance and output by analysts in general.

5. We also suggested--we thought clearly but perhaps not--that movement toward the goals outlined in our memorandum

should be gradual and experimental. We sought to provide a sense of direction more than to lay out a detailed program, and we think it best that the program be developed by engaging the production offices in the effort rather than by excluding them. It is our hope, for example, that the DDI would nominate a senior officer for the analytic training effort who could be a focal point in developing the program and would be, in effect, the senior DDI representative in OTR.

6. We should add, pursuant to our study of Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980, that our proposals were perhaps too modest. We did not propose a program of career development in cross-cultural understanding but only a brushing with the subject in one of the proposed courses. A program of that type would be very expensive and complex; we thought it beyond our assigned task. But we did propose, as a part of our discussion of the proposed new "Intelligence Institute," the creation of "small" centers for the study of analytical methodology, presentational methods, intelligence doctrine, and academic contacts. Two of these are already in existence, one in OTR and one in DDS&T. We suggest that attention to the other subjects is strongly urged by the DCI in Perspectives for Intelligence.

7. We would like to deal finally with some of the specific points which you raise in paragraphs 4 through 7 of your memorandum.

a. You say "courses a and b are fine."

Did you mean a and d? We are so assuming.

b. You comment that "course b intends to teach a great deal on estimates to people who in all likelihood would not be writing or participating in doing them for years." You add your preference for stress on "writing analyses which produce conclusions and judgments." We agree that the course should concern itself with analyses which produce conclusions and judgments--that is what we call estimating. An NIE is only a specialized form in which a few estimates are developed, and that form is one we propose to deal with in a separate forum (see next paragraph). Perhaps we should have titled the course "Analytic Exercises;" indeed, an earlier draft carried such a title - until we concluded that we ought to call a spade a spade. But to foreclose further misunderstanding, we will go back to it. It was noted in paragraph 3 of TAB A of our memorandum that this course was to be a refurbishing of the existing Intelligence Writing Techniques Course, which we felt was too intensive (thus reducing time available for attention to the problems of individuals) and too much directed toward NIE-type writing. It was, and remains, our aim to redirect the type of exercise toward what is actually done by analysts in the DDI production offices; toward

that end, we proposed that analysts from the production offices ^{be} ~~to~~ seconded to OTR for a week or two to help with planning and teaching the course.

c. Course c was included at ^{25X1A} [REDACTED] request. He has a real problem. In the old days, we in effect tutored our junior estimates writers. Today's NIO's have neither the time nor, in some cases, the capability to do so. We do not believe that estimate writing can be taught in school, at least not by lecturing at analysts. But it did seem to us that some kind of tutorial method could be evolved, and George specifically asked that ^{25X1A} [REDACTED] personally take a hand in it. We should add that we never accepted the stereotype approach to estimate writing, and we always operated on the belief that each estimate presented a unique analytical problem.

d. Your comment on Courses e and f (Oral Briefing Techniques and Use of Graphics) completely baffles us. We were unaware that they were given great attention or appeared "ostentatious." It is our belief that neither we nor our colleagues thought enough about graphic presentation of our work. There is a gap which needs to be filled, and the fact that there is strong pressure from above (Part III, paragraph 2c, of Perspectives for Intelligence) for more exploration of the subject

suggests that we are right. At the moment, our thought is to give these two courses a secondary priority, but to work at them gradually after surveying the resources which the Agency possesses and to utilize them in some way, either through a course or courses in OTR or in one of the other Agency components.

e. Regarding your paragraph 5, we could not agree more. We hope to develop a Seminar on Intelligence and National Policy in detail and to seek the views and suggestions of the DDI in the process. One possible procedure would be to name an ad hoc committee from the DDI, DDS&T, and NIO to help in the process.


f. We are also baffled by your paragraph 6. We did not say that OTR should be the place for assistance in application of new methodologies. We fervently believe that new techniques should be applied by those who use the techniques and that methodology and analysis are really two sides of the same coin. What we did say was that if an analyst wanted assistance or advice, OTR should be flexible enough to be able to give it on a tutorial basis and should not insist that the seeker take course so-and-so. We do believe that participation in an OTR course on methodology might lead an analyst to attack a problem in a way different from that which he had been following. Many analysts, especially those

new techniques, but many have not. Our aim is to open new doors to those who have not, so that they can better use their own ingenuity and imagination in resolving analytic problems.

g. We fully agree with your comment in paragraph 7. We would think that the CPR formula should be tried on one or two of the more complex and difficult subjects to see how it works.

8. In sum, whether we are talking about a "center," or a seminar, a course, or a staffing problem, we do not propose that everything be done at once. We would hope that everyone concerned--in OTR, DD1, or elsewhere--would consider the proposals we have outlined as constituting a set of goals to be approached gradually and experimentally.

25X1A



~~1-17-95~~
DTR

Career Development and Training for Analysis in C.I.A.

Chapter One - Approach

- I. Conceptual and Methodological Problems
- II. Thoughts on the Role of the Office of Training

Chapter Two - Analytic Training in Perspective

- I. The Environment and its Impact
- II. What the Analyst Does

Chapter Three - Toward a Philosophy of Analytic Training

- I. Goals and Methods
- II. Training Segments in Career Development
 - Pre-employment Training
 - Orientation
 - Updating and Retooling
 - Special Skills
 - Enhancement
 - Area and Country Study
 - Advancement of the Art

Chapter Four - Specific Curriculum Suggestions

- I. The Career Training Program
- II. An Intelligence Process Course
- III. Writing and Presentational Skills
 - Remedial
 - Introduction to Intelligence Analysis and Writing
 - Special Skills
- IV. Analytic Methods Exposure and Training
- V. Area-Country Study
- VI. Advanced Seminars and Advancement of the Art

Chapter Five - Management and Planing

- I. Management Impact of Suggestions
- II. Future Directions

Career Development and Training for Analysis in C.I.A.

Chapter One - Approach

I. Conceptual and Methodological Problems

1. The task to which we were assigned by the Director of Training was to determine what the Office of Training could or should do to contribute to career development and training for analysis in the CIA. The decision to undertake this study was prompted by a number of factors:

a. The historical fact that the resources of the Office of Training had been directed primarily toward the training of operators rather than analysts since its inception.

b. Recognition that the numbers and role of operators were declining and that both executive policy and the complexity of the problems confronting the Intelligence Community required an increased attention to analysis.

c. Recognition that (1) the resources of the Office of Training--though they had been increasingly allocated to analytic training--were not adequate for a substantial analytic program, (2) a new statement of objectives might be necessary as a prelude to future decisions on the allocation of resources, and (3) OTR might be obliged

2. We began our study by looking at the Office of Training itself and at its current offerings. We made a tentative judgment that the Mid-Career Course, the Advanced Intelligence Seminar, and the Senior Seminar were operating smoothly, were well ^{received} within the Agency, and were effective in giving new perspectives to the analysts as well as to the operators and managers who participated.

3. We turned our immediate attention to the activities of the newly-constituted Functional Training Division within OTR, which had been assigned responsibility for skills training. As we did so, we concluded that we were confronted with these judgmental and analytic problems:

a. What is the analytic function? Can it be broken down into discrete parts which can be separately approached from an educational point of view?

b. If so, what current needs and deficiencies exist? More important, what needs and deficiencies might appear in the future?

c. If such are identified, can they be met and remedied? If so, which can or should be met or remedied by recruitment, on-the-job training, classroom training, seminars, tutorials, external training, career development programs, development of the art (including research), or

d. Assuming defensible answers can be developed to the above questions, what recommendations can we make which could be undertaken by the Office of Training, and what broader recommendations should we make concerning the career development and training function within the Agency and Intelligence Community as a whole?

4. As with any study dealing with probing questions, there can be a comprehensive and thorough approach, a seal-of-the-parts approach, and a large number of mixed approaches in between. Given the limited resources and time available, it was obvious to us that there were some methods of study we could not adopt and some less-than-careful methods we would have to adopt. It was also apparent that some questions were unanswerable, that answers to some questions could not be defended by evidentiary materials, and that we would be obliged to rely upon own experience and judgment to a greater extent than we would consider desirable. For example, even if we could identify precise skills requirements for the analyst of, say, 1985 or 1995, we could not undertake a census of present analytic personnel to determine the degree to which these skills were present within the Agency. Similarly, even if it could be defended intellectually, we could not undertake a study comparing the careers and success of those who had some kind of formal training within the Agency with those who have not. Nor could we devise any method of proving or disproving that there was a direct relationship between "analytic training"--wherever it might have been procured--and the quality of the analytic production of individual analysts.

5. We have, therefore, been obliged to depend more upon our experience and judgment, and upon that of others, than we would have liked. It did not require deep probes to determine that the Office of Training had been offering relatively few skills courses for analysis (compared with offerings in operations and management) and had only recently established an information science program which was meeting a need and which was being well received within the Community. In addition, we received voluntarily from a number of persons inside and outside the Office of Training a number of suggestions for alterations and innovations. And we also quickly came to realize from our own experience and appreciation of the changing intelligence environment that a new look ought to be taken at the match between analytic capabilities and future needs.

6. We also concluded that, in the absence of a clear body of evidence with which to work and our inability to develop it with the time and resources available to us, we should establish a set of general principles and a group of preliminary suggestions as a hypothesis, put these down in an interim report, circulate this report and solicit responses to it, and then prepare a more definitive report in the light of those responses. This report is, then, a modification and extension of our original report, based partly upon those responses and partly upon the maturation of our own thoughts since our preliminary observations were circulated.

II. Thoughts on the Role of the Office of Training

7. Conceptually, the Office of Training has, or should have, two distinct functions--and they should be kept distinct. The first is to administer certain training programs, to act as an information exchange point and facilitator for training activities it does not administer, and to develop and conduct formal courses and seminars open to Agency and Community personnel. The other function is to act as the Agency's principal agent for thinking, proposing, and disposing in the general area of training and career development. OTR does not have, nor should it have, an exclusive role; the various directorates and offices and the various Community agencies have an imperative duty to think, propose, and dispose for training and career development within their jurisdictions. But the Office of Training has a continuing responsibility for taking that broad look which transcends the responsibilities of individual directorates and offices and which attempts to discern the training requirements which flow from changes and perspectives in intelligence.

8. This second--or developmental--function must be kept distinct from the first--or administrative--function, since not all, and perhaps few, of the ideas or proposals related to training and career development will need to be administered or should be administered by the Office of Training. Thus, while OTR should not confine itself to administering programs, neither should it claim exclusivity as a developer and promoter of training programs.

9. We think of our mission as directed toward both these functions. In this report, as distinct from our interim report, we go beyond what can be done within the Office of Training. But we bear the distinction in mind. The suggestions we offer are not, simply because we offer them, proposals for new OTR programs and courses. But we also do make some specific proposals to be carried out within the OTR complex.

I. The Environment and its Impact

10. Before undertaking to confront the specific problems noted in paragraph 3 of the first chapter, it seemed to us that we first of all needed to deal with the environment in which analysts will be operating over the next quarter century. By "environment," we mean several things:

- a. the kinds of world problems with which the analyst will be dealing,
- b. the nature of the tools he will have,
- c. the extent and character of the information he will possess,
- d. the complexity of the analytic problems he will confront,
- e. the bureaucratic and political context in which he will be working and into which the results of his analysis will be fed.

11. We cannot, of course, describe that environment in a definitive way. Nor should we try to add our judgmental voices to those of "futurists" who have substantial resources at their disposal. But we can derive certain general

guidelines from what they have said and from what has emerged in the past decade. Some of these are:

a. World problems of which the United States will become cognizant and in which it will become engaged will be greatly different from those of the past, might emerge suddenly and might reach critical proportions quickly, and might not be amenable to solution through the making of option-derived decisions, the exercise of existing capabilities, or the pursuit of other traditional approaches.

b. Information on some subjects will expand and on other subjects will shrink; new subjects upon which information is needed will emerge; the balance between available and required information will nearly always be far from perfect; the analyst will be inundated by information on some subjects and starved on others.

✓ c. Shortages and inbalances in information will to some extent be correctible through the growing mastery of modern analytic tools (the computer, the photograph, and other developing or undeveloped and undiscovered technical and analytical means for marshalling and manipulating data).

d. Increasing human capacity to manipulate and

control and by the intractability of certain sociogenic and naturogenic problems) is producing an ever-widening scope for study of matters affecting US national interest; widening interdependence of nations, events, natural forces, etc., makes isolation of a problem or phenomenon for purposes of analysis more difficult, and makes the implications of national decisions more extensive than in the past.

e. The above factors make intelligence gathering, analysis, and reporting more difficult; they make comprehension and decision-making more complicated; they attenuate the impact of decision. As a consequence, the analyst must learn to anticipate his needs, to manipulate his data in a broader context, and to communicate his factual and implicative judgments in as easily discernible and meaningful a way as possible.

12. We can, we think, draw some broad inferences from these guidelines about the environment in which the intelligence analyst will be working--inferences with a particular meaning for the Office of Training:

a. An institutional training organization must be adaptive. The essential qualities of an analyst in the environment described are his breadth of knowledge, his openness and objectivity of outlook, his capacity to work with and learn new tools, and his ability to communicate. Acquiring analysts with those qualities is primarily a

and must be prepared to help him to adapt those qualities, not only to the intelligence environment upon his entry, but also to the changes in it which will occur.

b. The institutional training organization must be highly flexible. It must be ready and able quickly to discard old and create new programs, courses, seminars, or tutorials, or what have you. It must not be hung up on a particular way of doing things--above all, it must not respond in knee-jerk fashion to a perceived or suggested need by either affirming that it is "already doing that" or "we will set up a course to do that." (Unfortunately, the often highly defensible constraints of personnel limits and abilities, monetary resources, committee rule, upward and outward responsibility for informing and coordinating and approving--all tend toward bureaucratization and immobilism.)

c. Above all, it must be alert. It must know its clientele. Its agenda must always include an effort to find out what is troubling analysts, supervisors, and office directors. It must itself keep in touch with the intelligence product so that it can think creatively about future needs. It cannot rely upon registration figures, student evaluations, or questionnaires. It must have a continuing infusion of new blood from the analytic offices into its staff, and it must keep in personal touch with

II. What the Analyst Does

13. One of the most difficult descriptions to write is a definition of intelligence analysis. There are wide differences of opinion among people who call themselves analysts. There are semantic problems: What is an estimate? What is analytic writing? What is a "report" when the analyst uses the term? Is there a difference between a research report and an analytic report? The subject screams out for clarification, but one man's clarification is often another's red flag.

14. We choose here to talk about "intelligence analysis" in the interest of avoiding debate over the general use of the term in the world outside. And when we talk about "intelligence analysis," we recognize that even here there are varieties and species which do not fit under a general definition. One can say that analysis is the critical collection, examination, manipulation, and dissemination of information. But then one has to define each of these terms. Our task requires us to determine whether the analytic function can be broken down into discrete parts which can be approached from an educational point of view. We think, therefore, that it would be helpful to try to define what an intelligence analyst does and see what help that gives us. This is what we have come up with:

a. He asks himself what he wants to know and why.

He tentatively breaks down the question into its component

b. He establishes an hypothesis as to whether what he wants to know is a palpable, knowable fact or is a tendency, a trend, or a negatable (i.e., indeterminate, reversible, or instable) fact.

c. He considers whether what appears to be the relevant information is available or readily procurable. He considers whether there may be information apparently irrelevant which could prove relevant. He considers whether, as a working hypothesis, he can work with what is available or readily procurable, and whether it is both necessary and practicable to procure more.

d. Having broken the question down into what seemed its component parts, he begins to marshal the data under those parts in a logical pattern. In so doing he may have recourse to certain analytical tools (such as the computer). He might in some types of problems want to set up a model as an aid in thinking about relevancy. Where he finds he is short of data or where the data are so indeterminate as to be non-effective, he will reexamine the question of relevancy and attempt to determine (possibly with help of a computerized model) how critical the lack or indeterminacy of the data really is. He will throughout this process seek the advice of colleagues and supervisors, especially where critical choices, evaluations, or quantifications occur.

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tested,
and checked his data, evaluations, and tentative judgments,
he goes back to his original question, his tentative break-
down of that question into component parts, his hypothesis
about the knowability and palpability of the answer, and
his judgments on relevancy, and he reexamines them. If
he alters any of these in the light of his learning, he
begins again the process of marshalling, evaluating,
testing, etc.

f. Finally, he writes his report--by whatever noun
that report is known. The noun is most often tailored not
so much to the subject-matter as to the recipient. The
recipient and his role in the bureaucratic and political
system now become crucial to the format, length, level of
detail, use of language, and other aspects of the
communication involved.

15. An examination of the above description of an "analytic"
process (admittedly atypical in detail for many analysts--though
we believe essentially correct for the intellectual process
involved) suggests that the principal ingredients are the analyst's
knowledge of his subject, his perceptiveness, his objectivity,
and his intellectual rigorousness. If an analyst is a sow's
ear, he will remain a sow's ear, and training will not turn
him into a silk purse, nor should he be allowed to claim silk
pursehood by taking training exercises. But if he is silk he
can be made into a purse, and if he is already a purse, he can
be adorned with silver.

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silk purse, he can be retooled to carry a heavier metal. The

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problem is to develop a theory on what is done to work with silk, how that is done, what is done, and who does it. That is the subject of the following section.

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I. Goals and Methods

16. Cavalier remarks about silk purses and sow's ears do not, of course, dispose of the matter of training. One is, after all, dealing with human beings who do not, like Athena, spring fully armed from the brow of Zeus. Moreover, the bureaucratic and political environment in which the intelligence analyst works has its own peculiarities and problems. There are some things that have to be learned-- the vocabulary, the structure, the people, the rules (written and unwritten), etc. Minor deficiencies can be at least confronted and perhaps corrected. New institutional needs can often be met by retooling the analyst rather than by getting rid of him. This Agency is not functioning in a free labor market; it cannot expect to recruit exactly what it wants, and it cannot throw away what fails to meet precise needs or is no longer required in a particular position or area of activity.

17. We are dealing then with orientation, correction, updating, and retooling as basic requirements of a training program. But the training function goes further; it must engage with enhancement of the capabilities of the analyst, and it must do this--not to be kind to the individual and to advance his career--but to improve the quality of the intelligence product and to economize resources, i.e., to get the very best the Agency and Community can get from its analytic personnel.

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18. While confronting a variety of tasks, the training function is dealing with a variety of analysts. There are in the Agency perhaps some 2,000 persons engaged in some form of analytic work. They exist in all the Directorates, in the upper two-thirds of the grade classifications, in all ages, in nearly every field of professional competence, and in all ranges of experience. They are different kinds of people in terms of personal goals, professional needs, social behavior, background and upbringing--in short, the works. There is no low common denominator to be used in deciding who should or should not be exposed to a particular type of training. Some might need some things, some might need none. Some do best learning on the job, some might learn faster by systematic classroom exposure. Some think best in a group atmosphere, some do best alone.

19. In substance, therefore, any training for analysts can only be done with a large ingredient of tailoring, including allowing the analysts and their supervisors to fashion their own clothing. Such tailoring should apply to both subject matter and method. If the subject matter is one that can be advanced by utilizing resources within the Agency (or by utilizing resources which can be brought to it), do it that way. If it is one that can best be advanced by outside training, do it outside. If the analyst cannot be spared for full-time training, do it part-time. If the learning-explorative process can best succeed by intensive training, make it intensive; if it can best succeed by being extended over time, extend it. If a seminar is the most appropriate forum for the analyst, use

a seminar, if a tutorial is best suited to the analyst, use a tutor.

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20. Since we have analysts performing a wide variety of tasks who have a wide variety of needs and who have a wide variety of personal attitudes and aptitudes, it is quite clear that large numbers of set requirements, programmed sequences, or formal classroom courses are simply inappropriate. It should also be clear that there is no single course or group of courses which will provide magic entry into the world of analysis or success in it. This is not to say that there should not be programs or courses, but it does mean that programs must be goal-oriented rather than requirement-oriented and that courses or seminars or tutorials must be tailored to individuals and groups and not to the availability of instructional staff or its peculiar interests and qualifications.

21. The goals we are talking about are the career development of different kinds of analysts, with the Office of Training providing some of the means--along with such others as on-the-job training, outside training, and his own maturation as an individual. The careers we are talking about are those of economist, photo interpreter, political analyst, military analyst, elint analyst, etc. We are also talking about such cross-disciplinary careerists as country or area specialists, general estimators, editors, presentational arts specialists, future and actual branch and division chiefs, future and actual office directors and deputy directors and their staffs. The process of career development

is never ending, and its component parts range from on-the-job learning to formal courses, from job rotation to special briefings, from extensive travel to intensive study, and so on. There might be, and probably should be, some degree of formalization in some career development areas to insure that the process is not lost through bureaucratic inertia or the pressures of daily business. There might be, and probably should be, some formal classroom training for some steps in some career development areas, i.e., for those people and in those cases where it would be most efficient. In the following sections we consider what formal institutional training might do to contribute to career development for the various kinds of analysts.

II. Training Segments in Career Development

Pre-Employment Training

22. It is clear to us that the most important qualifications of an analyst are those he brings to his employment in the first place. The recruiters, whether they are designated recruiters in the Offices of Personnel and Training or intelligence production officers looking for particular skills, are more important in this respect than the training officer or the production supervisor. It is in the pre-employment period that the analyst has acquired much of the professional knowledge, skills, or techniques that will make him useful. These may be highly specialized or very general; we have seen highly skilled and masterful craftsmen emerge from analysts who have arrived with a good general education. We know of several women

who are skilled military analysts and never wore a military uniform, and we know of several former and well-trained military officers who failed as military analysts.

23. For most analytic work, we think there is a quality much more important than specific skills--a quality without which even the most skilled cannot function effectively. This is a hard-to-define combination of openness to ideas, readiness to confront the new and contradictory, objectivity, intellectual curiosity, commitment to the rigorous and unemotional pursuit of truth, discipline of thought, carefulness with facts, and clarity of mind and expression (though not necessarily a verbal capacity in expression). This is a combination often more difficult to detect than specific skills, and this often results in poor selection; it is easier for the recruiter to think that someone else has done that job by granting degrees or passing candidates for employment through certain formal training programs in educational or other institutions than it is for him to find out whether the candidate for analytic employment possesses this combination of qualities.

Orientation

24. Having been taken on board, the new employee (whether he intends to go into an analytic position or not) will find some orientation useful if only because of the peculiarities of the intelligence business. We think much can be done in a formal course and that it can be made interesting and effective. On-the-job orientation can be

done, but it tends to leave gaps which the analyst might not even know of.

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A training course which assures that all the major bases are touched might open avenues for the analyst in obtaining and manipulating data which he might otherwise not even know were available to him for exploitation or exploration. Thus, there ought to be available a general course on the intelligence process for most new intelligence analysts which will systematically explain what is done and how it is done. Such a course could, and in some cases should, be supplemented by specialized orientation courses in individual Agency components to provide specific help to the new employee, or to the old employee new to the subject. In addition, some new employees--especially new political analysts or others likely to advance to senior supervisory positions--probably should be given a course which would familiarize them with covert operations and thus make more facile their relations with the Operations Directorate and their understanding of information procured by covert means.

Updating and Retooling

25. Updating and retooling are a constant requirement for even the best qualified and best trained analysts and supervisors. Perhaps the most deadening spirit in an organization is a persistent belief in the eternal correctness of its way of doing things. Unless the leadership of a Directorate, office, or division operates on the assumption that there may be a better approach to its problems than the one it is pursuing, there is no alternative but to change the leadership.

Approved For Release 2000/08/04 : CIA-RDP78-06215A000200010006-0

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But if one is constantly looking for--change and improvement, then there is much to be done. Most of it can and should be done at home by encouraging staff to try other methods and techniques. The training function intervenes when new methods, approaches, and techniques can be broken down into specific and identifiable subjects for training or indoctrination. For technical subjects this can best be done in the Agency component involved or through external training. For other more generalized subjects, the training can probably be most economically accomplished on an agency-wide or community-wide basis through specific courses, e.g., in methodology or in the application of certain methodological techniques.

Special Skills

26. Special skills in some fields of intelligence are easy to identify and to teach by classroom methods. Economic modeling, telemetry, and many specific subjects in communications or computer use easily come to mind. Other special skills are more difficult to identify and less adaptable to classroom instruction. Some, indeed, are better learned than taught. Analytic skill, because it is so hard to define when one goes beyond the use of specific methodologies, is not a discrete academic subject. But there are some particular steps in the analytic process for intelligence purposes which can be separated out for particular attention through a more-or-less tutorial process. Some of these relate to presentation and they might impose a greater rigor upon earlier stages of the analytic process. To present the

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results of analysis in a meaningful way (which is, after all, the main purpose of an intelligence system), one must have covered the relevant terrain. Thus, breaking down a question into component parts, making an orderly and logical progression of facts and judgments, presenting the material in a particular form for a particular purpose or audience, developing appropriate and meaningful graphic forms of presentation, these are skills which most analysts must exercise. There are analysts who are outstanding in their knowledge of a subject, in their care and objectivity in dealing with evidence, and in their imaginative range in sorting out hypotheses and meanings, but who need guidance and help in learning to marshal and present their analyses in the most effective manner. For these people and for those new employees who can profit from some practice and indoctrination in particular forms of reporting and presentation, training can usefully be done either in Agency components or by the Office of Training in forms adaptable to the particular need.

Enhancement

27. It is in the enhancement of the capabilities of an already qualified analyst that the training function can be most challenging and rewarding and yet most difficult to formalize. The aim is to expand the horizons of the analyst, to provide him an opportunity for reflection and study, to help him to work with different people, ideas, and materials, to enable him to grasp new disciplines relevant to his tasks

and to join with others in this and more can contribute to his maturation and capability and

thus to a better product. These can be accomplished within
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an office or Directorate through job rotation and sponsorship
of external training; they can also be accomplished within
the Agency training program. OTR's Senior Seminar, Advanced
Intelligence Seminar, and Mid-Career Course are some means
designed to do so.

28. We think that by being adaptive, flexible, and
alert the Office of Training can make a further contribution
to this end. There probably are courses on particular
subjects which could be developed and offered on an occasional
basis. Almost certainly special seminars on particular
intelligence problems of a substantive or methodological
character can be established. Such seminars would often
provide the cross-disciplinary approach which many of the
intelligence problems of the future will require for solution.
They would create the opportunity for the members to educate
themselves and each other and at the same time advance the
solution of real intelligence problems.

29. An intelligence organization deals not only with means and functions (energy, trade, missiles, electromagnetic radiations, photographs, etc), it deals with peoples and cultures and political and economic behavior. It needs analysts who can deal not only with quantifiable and hard data but analysts who can combine the use of such data with a deep understanding of the peoples who live and work in a country or area of the world. Prediction and defining the limits and character of predictability are the pay-off of the intelligence system. Hard facts are indispensable, but the big reward comes from the correctness of the conclusions one derives from placing those in the perspective of the human and historical forces at work in a situation. The best analyst is the one who can make the judicious amalgam of the hard with the human.

30. Area and country study is one form of the enhancement of the capabilities of the analyst. We are not speaking here of a precisely defined area specialist. He may be a linguist, geographer, historian, political or economic analyst, or a combination thereof. He may be a missileman plus a linguist and economist, or some other combination; perhaps the greater the variety of combinations the better. We might have an area

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or culture, economy and politics of a region, and an area or country specialist who knows some of those along with a functional specialty.

31. We do not say that each analyst ought to know everything about the geographic region he is working on (that is impossible anyway), but that many if not most analysts ought to know a good deal more than they do. An analyst working on the Chinese advanced weapons program ought to know a good deal about China, and the analyst working on the Italian economy ought to know a good deal about Italian history and the life habits and personal philosophy of Italians. An analyst who has a good working knowledge of the Arabic language and of the history of the Middle East and North Africa can make himself much more valuable by acquiring a functional capability in Middle East politics and economics and in the world of energy and international finance generally. We are speaking of area and country specialization not as a good-in-itself but as a value in combination with identifiable intelligence problems of the present and future. Conversely we are arguing that functional specialization without a sound and extensive area or country knowledge is less than ideal and might even prove deleterious.

32. We think, therefore, that more thought and study ought to be devoted to the role which area or country specialization--including language--can and ought to play in the

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training

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program as a whole. We are laying out some possibilities in a later chapter; our primary concern here is that the role of area and country study should be thought about as a tool in the enhancement of the capabilities of many analysts and not of a select few who choose to be linguistically qualified.

Advancement of the Art

33. We think that a training organization ought to consider, in the selection and use of its staff and in the allocation of its resources, that its responsibility extends beyond instruction to the improvement of the intelligence process itself. This is not to imply that other components of the Agency and the Community are not doing so; indeed they are and should be continually attempting to improve their methods and their performance. The point is that the training organization should similarly be concerned to do more than pass on the lore of the past and to facilitate the career development of the Agency's personnel. The same staff and resources whose function is education can and should be put to use to learn and explore the problems of intelligence and to incorporate the results into the educational process.

34. A training organization is a center which receives the wisdom and practice which has been developed, systematizes it into elements, and then disseminates it to its clientele. We suggest that in the systematization process the training organization itself can add an analytic and developmental

Approved For Release 2000/08/04 : CIA-RDP78-06215A000200010006-0

ingredient which can crystallize, enhance, correct, and amplify that wisdom and practice into new and useful ideas and methods.

35. The Office of Training already has a Center for the Study of Intelligence which has initiated studies into some aspects of the intelligence process. These studies should be expanded, with care taken that they become, not merely recordings of past experience, but meaningful insights into present and future problems. We suggest that there may be other centers which could advance the art of intelligence by absorbing what has been and is being done, by trying to formalize and augment this, and by passing on the product to others in the form of publication and instruction. One such aspect of intelligence is the presentational art, which is an integral and critical part of the analytic process. As we suggested earlier, presentation in an accurate and meaningful fashion to the particular customer is becoming more complicated as subject matter becomes more complex and the implications of governmental action more extensive.

✓ Chapter Four-Specific Curriculum Suggestions

36. We here use the term "curriculum" in its broadest meaning. We use it, not in the sense of a programmed, sequential series of courses, but in the sense of the total offerings and functions of the educational effort. In this sense it includes the atmosphere as well as the course catalogue, the tutorial as well as the classroom, the imaginative idea as well as the special skill. The curriculum we speak of involves the Office of Training's activities and the specific training activities of other Agency components; it also involves such other education-motivated decisions as job rotation and foreign travel. The career development of Agency analysts is engaged with the whole bundle.

27. In the sections below we take up the various aspects of training which we identified in the preceding chapter--orientation, updating and retooling, special skills and enhancement--in terms of some specific programs and offerings. Some of these can be carried out easily, and some will entail further study and detailed planning.

I. The Career Training Program

38. The Career Training Program in C.I.A. is unique in that it makes an effort to centralize responsibility for

the recruitment and early training of analysts (and operators and managers, as well, though we are concerned here only with analysts), that is, this program places upon the Office of Training the major responsibility for the ^{selection} ~~recruitment~~, formal course instruction, and on-the-job-learning of a particular group of people during a period of approximately one year. Thus, the Office of Training has a great opportunity to do it well or to botch it.

39. In our discussions with those responsible for this program, a consensus has been reached upon a number of important points:

a. All career trainees, whether intending to enter analytic work or not, should have a general orientation in the intelligence process.

b. Career trainees intending to enter analytic work should have some training in the preparation of intelligence reports.

c. Career trainees intending to enter analytic work should have a brief formal familiarization with covert operations.

d. Career trainees intending to enter analytic work should be offered a course in the application of new analytic methods to intelligence problems.

e. Career trainees and other qualified new professional employees should not be required to take the Intelligence in World Affairs Course now required of all new employees. That course probably should be retained for other new employees. Those parts of it which deal with orientation to employment in C.I.A. (such as personnel services, etc.) can be covered in a few days' special orientation for C/T's.

40. The precise order in which C/T's should take these particular courses is more a question of administrative management than education. Obviously not all members of an entering class can take the Intelligence Process Course at the same time, since 20 is probably the maximum effective class size. A course in report writing would probably also have a similar (or smaller) effective maximum. It would be best to have the Intelligence Process Course taken as early as possible, though not necessarily at the beginning of the C/T program. The courses on report writing and on application of new analytic methodologies should come late, rather than early, in the trainee's program, i.e., after he has had

working experience in the Agency.

II. An Intelligence Process Course

41.
6. We conceive of an Intelligence Process Course as a basic orientation course (beyond how to find the health service and credit union) for all professional employees-- analytic, operational, and managerial. We think of it running about five weeks.

42.
7. The old Intelligence Production Course, which ran for eight weeks, was O/TR's principal bow in the direction of so-called analytic training. It was offered to those career trainees who had decided to enter the analytic directorates and to other new or aspiring professional analysts. In the case of the career trainees, it was given after their interim assignments and just before their regular work assignments. For many of its students it was probably too long, too late, and too elementary. During 1974, and ~~partly as a result of our suggestions~~, this course was reduced to about five weeks and some elements of it were dropped or broken out for separate course treatments. Thus, the last running of the course (from 7 October to 13 November 1974) was approaching our idea of what the Intelligence Process Course should be like.

43. We propose the Intelligence Process Course as an orientation course for all professional employees because we believe (a) that many operational and managerial officers have had an insufficient understanding of what the analyst does and how he does it, and (b) that many analysts have had an insufficient understanding of collection methods, especially clandestine ones. (As noted above, we also have proposed that career trainees should be briefly exposed to covert operational methods.) We propose roughly that the Intelligence Process Course cover the following, in approximately the order listed:

- a. Intelligence objectives and organization.
- b. The requirements system.
- c. Open and official collection means.
- d. Clandestine and non-acknowledged collection methods--technical and human.
- e. Storage and retrieval systems.
- f. Analytic problems and methods.
- g. Observation of analysts at work in C.I.A., D.I.A., INR.

- h. New and peculiar collection and analytic problems, such as multinational corporations, terrorism.
- i. Presentation, consumption, and use of intelligence, especially in foreign and military policy.

44. The Intelligence Process Course may have to be run as many as six times a year, since it should be offered to new and aspiring professional analysts as well as career trainees. This may require additional staff and will put an added burden on those Agency offices and officers who assist in instruction. This suggests that (a) several persons from individual Agency components rather than a single individual in the appropriate components be called upon to assist, and (b) greater effort be made to acquire the assistance of senior working level, rather than senior supervisory level, officers for instructional assistance.

45. The existence of an Agency-wide orientation in the intelligence process as a whole for professional personnel does not eliminate, and indeed may enhance, the need for Agency components to conduct their own orientation programs for new employees or old employees new to their activities. We urge them to do so, and believe that the Agency-wide course should in no way try to introduce into this course

what can be more thoroughly and effectively handled by the component concerned.

III. Writing and Presentational Skills

46. Presenting facts and ideas in a clear, precise, and effective way is a complex art and certainly not one which can be taught in a short course in any educational forum. It is, we believe, a skill which emerges from clear thought, vocabulary proficiency, knowledge of the rules of English grammar, and practice. In the intelligence business, it involves a good deal more--knowledge of the subject matter, a clear idea of who the recipient of the report is and of what he already knows, and an appreciation of what the policy issues are which would be affected by the report. Thus, the good writer of an intelligence report is one who has been well-trained before he came to C.I.A., who knows what he is writing about, and who knows why and for whom he is preparing a report.

47. This does not mean there is nothing the Office of Training or the employee's supervisor can and should do. On the contrary, there are a number of steps that can be taken to make it easier for the well-trained officer to function better in the intelligence environment. Moreover, there are some things that ought to be done to remedy defects in the

writing performance of otherwise well-qualified employees, and there are some things which can be done to advance the art of presentation in order to make the intelligence product more useful or to increase its impact. The educational function breaks down into these separate parts:

a. Remedial.

b. Introduction to, and some practice in, particular types of intelligence analysis and report writing.

c. Guidance and practice in the development of certain skills.

d. Development and exposition of particular forms of presentation.

Remedial

48. The Office of Training currently offers two remedial courses:

a. Effective Writing. This a part-time course consisting of eight sessions and taught by an outside instructor. It is a basic course concentrating on grammar and structure.

b. Writing Better Reports. This is also a part-time course, consisting of eight sessions and taught by an O/TR instructor. It concentrates on types of reports prepared in C.I.A. and is designed to help otherwise qualified employees to improve their capacity to communicate clearly and effectively. It is semi-tutorial in method.

49. Of these two courses there is certainly more justification for the second than for the first. We suspect that the titles and descriptions of the two courses are sufficiently similar, however, to confuse training officers and students concerning the proper selection for a particular individual. Perhaps students have enrolled for the first when they should have taken the second. We wonder whether continuation of the first is justifiable and suggest that serious consideration be given to dropping it. An employee unable to write English in a generally acceptable way ought to be transferred to a position not requiring written communication. The second course probably serves a useful purpose.

Introduction to Intelligence Analysis and Writing

50. At the present time the Office of Training offers a course in Intelligence Writing Techniques. Originally

a part of the old Intelligence Production Course and then broken out for separate handling, it is designed primarily for Career Trainees entering the Intelligence Directorate. It consists of writing exercises related to current types of intelligence reports and involves considerable individual guidance. NPIC, CRS, and OER also have courses within their respective offices to assist employees in learning reporting methods peculiar to their subject matters.

51. As a general rule, we would think that introducing employees to particular types of report writing and guidance and practice in preparing them is the responsibility of the production office itself. We also think, however, that some experimentation with the Intelligence Writing Techniques Course would be useful to see what can be done to help new employees, especially career trainees and other well-trained recruits, to slip more readily into the type of analysis and writing which is done in the Intelligence and Scientific Directorates.

52. We would suggest experimentation along the following lines:

- a. Change the name of the course to "Analytic Exercises."

- b. Increase course from one to two weeks.
- c. Associate with its staffing, for a two-or-three-week period, able working-level officers from certain production offices in DD/I and DD/S&T.
- d. Assign to each working group under the guidance of an officer detailed from the production office a live topic for preparing a brief intelligence report (one week).
- e. Assign to the group as a whole the task of preparing a coordinated analysis with predictive judgments on a live topic (one week).
- f. The "live" topics involved could be all related to a single country or a single functional area. They would be "live" in the sense of being real problems and involve the use of real data, though they may not necessarily be "live" in the sense of being related to current events or current policy problems.

Special Skills

53. While the special skills related to the presentation of intelligence production are primarily the responsibility of the production office itself, these are a few areas in which the central training office can be of assistance if it has or can develop the resources to do so. These are on problems which nearly all production offices have to some degree or on presentational methods which need further development or exploration. The areas with which we are concerned are (a) editing, (b) estimates writing, (c) use of graphics, and (d) oral presentation.

54. Editing: The Office of Training in 1974, in responding to the request of a production office offered to that office a short part-time seminar on editing led by a cleared and experienced contract employee. It was a highly successful seminar. It concentrated on the role of the editor, the philosophy of intelligence communication, and some practical exercises with "live" reports. We suggest that this is the type of adaptive response to need which the Office of Training should make clear it is prepared to do on demand.

55. Estimates Writing. Since the change in the procedure for preparing national intelligence estimates and memoranda

and assignment to the NIO's of heavy responsibilities for high-level intelligence production, a larger number of people in the Agency and Community have become involved in national intelligence production. Many of these people are unpracticed in preparing analytic reports for this particular clientele and this has increased the burden on the NIO's. The Office of Training has responded by offering a part-time seminar on estimate writing to be led by an experienced and cleared contract employee. The seminar is still in the process of being developed, but will offer tutorial help in analyzing estimative problems and preparing estimative reports on "live" topics.

56. Use of Graphics. We think that one of the more pressing problems in communicating intelligence information and analysis to recipients is that of making the results easily and quickly comprehensible (that, indeed, is the principal reason for the above recommendations suggesting special courses and seminars in the art of communicating). As the intelligence subject matter has become more complex, intelligence reports and analyses have become more intricate and lengthy. Users have become intimidated, not only by the complexity of the subject, but also by the length and complexity of the reports intended to elucidate it. The problem of communicating has greatly concerned the Director of Central Intelligence; in his Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980 he pressed for further exploration of the use of graphics in

presentation. We would like to see the Office of Training develop a new course designed to demonstrate ways in which designs, tables, graphs, maps, the lay-out of sentences and paragraphs, and other visible and non-verbal devices might be used in combination with verbal presentation to reduce the volume of words, make comprehension easier and quicker, and generally enhance the impact of the intelligence product.

57. Oral Presentation. We think that in some cases the intelligence product does not receive the attention it deserves because that attention is inhibited by the length of the document or the distribution system (including security controls). We think that a more aggressive program of oral intelligence briefings would help to increase the knowledge and impact of intelligence reports. To this end, there is a need for those who are substantively qualified (i.e., in most cases, the analysts who prepared the report) to be able to convert that report into an oral briefing with slides, maps, and other graphics, and to present it before important and critical audiences. We recommend that the Office of Training undertake to develop such a course using "live" materials, i.e., actual estimates and analyses of a significant character, to demonstrate how it can be done. We suggest, further, that once O/TR has developed the appropriate staff, that staff be made available to offer tutorials, seminars, or specific assistance in particular cases to the production offices in preparing actual oral presentations for use.

IV. Analytic Methods Exposure and Training

58. While there is no magic formula for making a good analyst, we do consider that the analyst of the next 25 years will rely less than in the past upon documentary and historical tools and more upon mathematical and computer-assisted analytic methods. As we suggested earlier, this is likely not because historical and documentary methods are wrong or inapplicable, but because they might not be available, because national or group behavior will depend upon a complex of factors upon which documentary material might not prove persuasive or decisive, and because many intelligence topics will involve quantities and quantifications of data that can be manipulated only by machine methods.

59. We think that new analysts and those already in the Agency and Community (regardless of rank or position) can be helped by formal classroom exposure to some of the newer analytic methods which have been developed in universities and research organizations. The Office of Training currently offers ^{three} these courses relating to the retrieval and manipulation of data through machine methods and quantification. These are:

- a. Survey of Intelligence Information Systems--a full-time three-week course. About two-thirds of the enrollment is from outside CIA.

b. Information Science for Intelligence Functions--a

four-week full-time course. About two-thirds of the enrollment is from outside CIA.

c. Systems Dynamics: Principles and Applications--a

three-week full-time course. About ____ of the enrollment ^{is} ~~if~~ from outside CIA.

60. Supplementing these general courses, the Office of Economic Research offers a number of special courses dealing with analytic methods and the uses of machines in economic analysis. The Office of Elint in DD/S&T offers a course in computer systems, and the Office of Joint Computer Support in DD/A has an ^{extensive} ~~extreme~~ panoply of courses ranging from Computer Systems Fundamentals to Advanced Systems Analysis. We presume that all of these courses meet specific needs and assume they will be continued, discontinued, extended, and adapted as needs change.

61. What we discern in the courses offered in both O/TR and the Agency components mentioned above is a fairly advanced adaptation of new analytic and machine-assisted methods of analysis to the problems of economic intelligence, to various aspects of technical and scientific intelligence, and to various aspects of military and weapons intelligence. / What we have seen leads us to conclude that there has been inadequate development of the application of new analytic and machine-assisted methods to political, psychological, and sociological intelligence, to negotiating situations, to crisis management (including military

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dispositions and ^{postures} (and applications), and
to analysis of factors and forces involved in decision-making.

62. The Offices of Current Intelligence and of Political Research have been carrying out some experiments in such applications, and the Center for the Development of Analytic Methodology in DD/S&T has been moving forward with a number of projects designed to apply new methods and machine capabilities to existing intelligence problems. We think the time has arrived to make an effort to incorporate some of these experiments and applications into a general offering by the Office of Training.

63. We therefore suggest the creation of a new course in New Analytic Methodologies and their Application to Intelligence Analysis. We suggest that this course run about four weeks, full-time, and that its initial enrollment consist of career trainees and other new analytic personnel. After development and some initial runnings, it might then be adapted in shorter form for more senior personnel who are unfamiliar with these methods and their application. (One complaint we have heard is that junior personnel have been unable to convince their bosses that there is anything useful to be done with these methods.) We recognize the difficulty of developing such a course and suggest that it would entail a good deal of cooperation between O/TR's existing instructional staff and analysts and students of methodology outside O/TR. We think also that once such a course has been developed, the instructional staff should be available on a tutorial basis to provide on demand such help as it can in the development of new methodologies to intelligence problems.

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64. Prior to the development of such a course, we think the need for some familiarization with new methods and the use of the computer can be met by a one-week full-time short course construction of the present Information Science for Intelligence Functions course. Such a brief exposure would be useful, for example, to career trainees intending to enter the operations and administration directorates, and to supervisors in the analytic director^{at}es who could not spare the time or would not have the need for a more extensive practical course.

V. Area-Country Study

65. In our experience we have discerned some decrease in area-country specialization during the past decade--not only in terms of capabilities within the Agency and Community, but within the academic community as well. This is due to a number of things: the retirement or resignation of many of those who acquired specialization during WWII and the early post-war period, a decline in the US role in some areas of the world and an attenuation of the numbers assigned ab^oroad, a diminution of interest in foreign affairs by students in the university and by the country at large, decisions by individual employees--buttressed by promotion policies and personnel practices--that a more varied and successful career could be built by not becoming heavily committed to and identified with a particular area or country, a tendency to regard linguistic proficiency as an indispensable attribute of area-country specialization, and the observation that increased technicalization of intelligence was re^{at}ionalists. We

think this decline in area-country competence is unfortunate and ought to be remedied; we think that some of the reasons for this decline are within the Agency's power to remove.

66. We suggest that some of the considerations which ought to govern an Agency program to strengthen area-country competence are:

a. Language proficiency is helpful but not essential for high competence on many area and countries. Some language proficiency is essential to achieve high competence for those areas and countries which are important and whose culture and life-style are non-European.

b. High area-country competence for a limited number of employees on each major area or major country is essential; for most employees working on a country or area high competence is not necessary.

c. Employees who are functionally employed, i.e., on technical-scientific, military, or economic analysis, should have a competence in the area-country on which they are working which substantially exceeds that strictly related ^{required by} to their functional endeavor.

d. Area-country specialists, including those linguistically proficient, should acquire some functional specialty in order to enhance their usefulness.

67. Given the wide variety of jobs which analysts do, the wide spectrum of competence with which they come to their jobs, and the ^{VARY} ~~range~~ degrees of need for area-country competence which apply, there can be no set program for training them. The responsibility rests primarily with the career service in which the employee works and which presumably will take account of his personal desires and abilities as well as that of the service itself. But there are certain guidelines which can be suggested and certain training courses or seminars which can be adopted. We suggest the following:

a. Analysts who need some language capability or would find it useful should be encouraged to enroll in the part-time language familiarization short courses or in the part-time reading courses.

b. There should be a more extensive interchange of personnel between the DD/I and DD/O, to enable DD/I careerists a greater opportunity to acquire a knowledge of local language and culture and to enable the DD/I to benefit from the acquired understanding of DD/O officers.

c. There should be frequent visits by DD/I analysts to the country and area of their specialization. Often changes in atmospherics and in physical and cultural characteristics ^{ic} are unconveyable by written reporting.

d. In the career development of country specialists they should be encouraged to widen their geographic speciality to the region (or even the continent) as they progress, and they should be rewarded by advancement when they do so.

e. Functional specialists should be encouraged to develop a better country or area knowledge.

68. By and large, the language training curriculum of the Office of Training provides opportunities for learning of the type and to the degree that area-country specialists might require. In area studies, however, O/TR offers relatively little:

a. A one-week full-time China Familiarization course.

b. A two-week full-time USSR Country Survey.

Both courses are fairly elementary and cater largely to persons on the periphery of analytic work. Neither of them is useful to the functional specialist who is already a sophisticated analyst but who needs help in understanding better the driving forces in that nation's policy and direction. Nor does either course do anything for the analyst who is a country specialist but wishes to explore more deeply some of the historical, cultural, political, economic or other factors at work there. O/TR had one such course for Latin American specialists, the Latin American Seminar (part-time for 12 weeks), but this was discontinued upon retirement of the instructor.

69. We suggest that O/TR begin gradually to expand its area-country training and begin by dropping the two courses which are of marginal value. In their place it should establish part-time seminars, on the order of the Latin American seminar, for area specialists who wish to deepen their understanding. In addition, it should develop seminars for functional specialists or specialists on other areas who would like to broaden their horizons. These latter seminars would hopefully draw in the missileman, the geographer, the economist, the nuclear physicist, and provide him the opportunity to participate in discussions of the doctrinal, historical, and other forces at work in the USSR or China and to contribute to others' understanding by input from his own experience. Should these approaches prove successful, O/TR could then move to other areas and initiate similar seminars.

VI. Advanced Seminars and Advancement of the Art

70. In an earlier chapter we suggested that "Advancement of the Art" was one of the segments of a training and career development system. In that connection, we suggested that it was a responsibility of the training organization to explore the problems of intelligence and to incorporate the results into the educational process. We also suggested that special seminars or short courses on particular substantive or methodological problems could be used to introduce the cross-disciplinary approach which many intelligence problems of the future will require. The Office of Training, recognizing that it has such responsibilities, early in 1974 created a Center for the Study of Intelligence and

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instituted, but has not yet implemented, a Discussion Group Program.

71. With the appointment of a Director of Studies in the Center for the Study of Intelligence effective in January 1975, we expect the work of the Center to expand in meaningful directions. We think that a center should also be established for the Development of Presentational Methods, the results of which could be fed into the skills courses we suggested earlier in this chapter. Both Centers should be guided by Advisory Committees named from within as without the Agency.

72. We endorse the Discussion Group Program, and we think that it should incorporate a general Advanced Seminar Program. We suggest below some of the subjects which might be covered, though in the most general sense seminar subjects should be adapted to events and needs rather than to the intellectual ^{bb} hobbies of these writers or anyone else. We also suggest that the Discussion Group-Advanced Seminar Program ought to be guided by an ad hoc advisory committee meeting from time to time to put forward and discuss suggested topics.

74. In addition to the topical seminars, we believe that one full-time three-week seminar be established for senior analytic personnel, though other senior Agency personnel might wish to participate. This would be a seminar on Intelligence and National Policy designed to do a number of things:

a. Bring ~~senior~~^c analytic personnel up to date on thought and research^h in the academic community on international relations doctrines and studies.

b. Reexamine the methods and objectives of intelligence in the last quarter of the twentieth century in terms of national needs and world developments.

c. Pay special critical attention to falacies¹ and hazards in intelligence analysis; to non-traditional, emerging and future targets of intelligence; to definitions of national security and future threats to national and world security.

d. Discuss and understand the changing role of intelligence within the government and in relations^t to the public, other nations, and transnational associations.

74. While there is some danger that the subject matter and organization of the seminar could overlap that of the Senior Seminar it would be the responsibility of the instructional staff to avoid this. We think a carefully and formulated seminar schedule and an ingenious selection of speakers from the academic community, government, and agency can prevent that overlap and develop a seminar which will be both highly stimulating and productive of new thought and directions in intelligence production.

75. The topical seminars (or discussion groups) we would think of as falling into two broad categories, those primarily substantive and those primarily methodological. In either case

we would think of them as meeting one afternoon a week or one afternoon a month for as long as the subject is required. Membership in the seminar would be by invitation and negotiation, with the advisory committee for the program playing a major role in the process of selecting the personnel as well as the topic.

76. We do not wish to recommend topics; we suggest the following as illustrative of our thinking. On the substantive side we would consider these as typical: the training and outlook of the Soviet leadership in the year 2000; the food-population relationship in the year 2000; impact of Communist participation in Western European governments; consequences of climatological changes. On the methodological side, we would consider these as typical: the role of judgment and intuition in making intelligence judgments; how to measure such intangibles as morale and cultural characteristics in assessing national power or predicting national policy; why "unexpected events" occurred which rendered traditional wisdom erroneous and how prediction of such events might be improved.

Chapter Five - Management and Planning

I. Management Impact of Suggestions

77. The total impact of our suggestions is expansionary. This may seem to be ill-advised at a time of curtailment of intelligence budgets, especially when a hard look is and should be directed at overhead and service functions. But our suggestions are in the direction of expanding training and career development for analysts, not for expanding training as a whole. In short, we think that some resources should be shifted to analytic training, and we think that this is supported not only by the needs we have described but by the directive of the President and the NSC Intelligence Committee.

78. We suggest that some, and perhaps all, of the budgeting impact of our proposals can be absorbed by several means:

a. By some shift of resources within the Office of Training and better utilization of O/TR personnel, including elimination of some present course offerings.

b. In view of the service provided to other USIB agencies by O/TR (especially in the Information Science courses), by the assumption of a part of the budgetary burden by those agencies or by the Intelligence Community Staff.

c. By a greater utilization of personnel from the analytic directorates on a short-term or part-time basis and by greater participation by analytic personnel in the planning and conduct of courses and seminars.

d. By the greater use of contract and academic personnel in the planning and conduct of courses and seminars.

79. Moreover, some of our suggestions do not involve the Office of Training in an administrative sense. The suggestion for greater rotation of personnel to advance and better utilize area-country knowledge and experience is a matter of personnel management within and between directorates. We have urged continued and perhaps extended orientation, methodology, and report-writing courses within offices and directorates. We think topical and methodological seminars will prove in many cases most appropriately conducted within directorates rather than agency-wide. The Office of Training should encourage and endorse all such activities and be prepared to help them in any way it can.

II. Future Directions

80. We see no reason to believe that the need for ^{analytic-related} training will be substantially reduced in the future. On the contrary, changes in the world situation, in the role of intelligence, in methods of collecting and manipulating data, and in the subject matter of collection and production are coming so thick and fast

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capabilities of analysts might accelerate rather than decline.

The responsibility for recognizing and meeting those needs is everyone's. As an organizational unit responding to agency-wide and to some degree community-wide needs, the Office of Training has a special, but not exclusive responsibility.

81. One of O/TR's principal management problems is how to respond to the need for greater attention to the training and career development needs of the analytic directorates and of intelligence community agencies without (a) reducing its attention to those operational training programs still required, (b) preempting training programs better carried out within the analytic directorates themselves. In short, while trying to respond, it should not over-respond.

82. The Office of Training has indeed moved a long ways from the time when it was essentially an arm of the Operations Directorate and its curriculum dominated by DD/O requirements. That was as it should have been, but we believe the time has come when the Office of Training should be regarded by the other Directorates as responding to their requirements as well. It is moving into a new role within the Agency, and in the future it probably will assume a broader role within the Community. That should be recognized, and the other Directorates should help it fulfill its functions.

83. We think that there are a number of steps which ought to be considered as ways to strengthen the responsiveness of the Office of Training to the needs of analytic directorates and the

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Community agencies and to assist the Office of Training in
meeting those needs:

a. A special assitant to the Director of Training for analytic-related training might be considered. There are a number of organizational units within O/TR concerned with analytic training--the Intelligence Institute, the Functional Training Division, and the Language School, to name the principal ones--with their responsibility running to the Director of Training. Unfortunately, managerial functions necessarily preempt a great deal of his time, and it might therefore be helpful for him to have a special assistant to spark and coordinate the various analytic training activities which we have suggested within the Office of Training and within the analytic directorates and the community. Such a special assistant to be most effective ought to be high-level officer with long experience in an analytic directorate, familiar with a wide range of analytic activities, and respected within the analytic directorates.

b. The Intelligence Community Staff should give early consideration to ^ust~~y~~dy^uing the extent to which it is feasible and economical to increase the amount and range of analytic-related training which O/TR will provide to the Community. Such a study and the guidelines which it would provide would assit O/TR in planning the acquisition and use of staff and resources.

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c. Insofar as possible, seminars organized and staffed

by the Office of Training should be conducted at the Headquarters Building (or other buildings if conducted primarily for personnel in those buildings). While we recognize that in some cases, especially full-time courses and seminars, it is desirable to separate a participant completely from his work and associations, we also believe that in some cases participation in a course or seminar is inhibited by the need to commit time and energy to travel between buildings. The physical separation of the Office of Training from the Headquarters is no doubt necessary because of the space needed for classrooms and other facilities, but it also creates a psychological isolation harmful to collaboration. We suggest that this psychological separation can be reduced through more extensive use of conference rooms in the Headquarters or other buildings for courses and seminars and more intensive use of the very limited space which O/TR has in the Headquarters Building.

d. We think that greater collaboration between the Office of Training and the analytic directorates (and a reduction of the psychological separation) would result from increased rotation of personnel. As a general proposition the Office of Training should have few staff personnel who are career educators; most of the staff should be people whose career is in other directorates and ^wshould remain so. A past tendency to use O/TR as a dumping ground for misfits seems to have ended, but this tendency has not been ^{superceded}suspended by an effort to staff O/TR with the best people available.

We think that the analytic directorates ought to take a

greater interest in O/TR staffing and that O/TR ought to be more aggressive in seeking high quality personnel on rotation.

84. The observations and suggestions we have made throughout this report are quite obviously a mixture of experiential judgments and, we hope, practical proposals. Others with different experience may have different judgments and hence other proposals. See Some of the questions we have raised and some of the suggestions we have made already have resulted in some changes in the O/TR curriculum. We think that others can be implemented with little shift in resources and direction. Some will require shifts in thinking and resources. We believe that an approach characterized by experimentation, flexibility, and alertness is more important than the creation of elaborate programs and curricula.

85. We have emphasized many times throughout this report that there is no magic formula for creating a good analyst or an easy highway toward high quality intelligence production. There are various skills and mind-expanding experiences related to the analytic function which can be opened up or developed through formal educational efforts in the central training facility and the production offices or directorates. Those that seem appropriate this year may not be appropriate next year. Objectives, programs, and courses must be kept under review. The objective, after all, is not to achieve tidiness or bureaucratic placidity, but to raise standards of excellence.